



Fuerza de Paz Conjunta Combinada Cruz del Sur

# Policy Brief

## Enhancing Peacekeeping Training Through Cooperation: Lessons from Latin America

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# Enhancing Peacekeeping Training Through Cooperation: Lessons from Latin America

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## Executive Summary

There is growing recognition at the UN and among member states that peacekeeping must be made more effective, especially in face of major budget cuts and wavering leadership by traditional actors. Against this backdrop, how can member states improve the quality of pre-deployment and mission preparation for UN peacekeeping? This policy brief focuses on one area in which innovation has become more urgent than ever: enhancing the effectiveness of peacekeeping through better training. More specifically, we analyze the emerging configurations, innovations, and challenges of international cooperation for peacekeeping training centers (PTCs), drawing on the case of Latin America.

Since the mid-2000s, cooperation among Latin American PTCs has both expanded and diversified due to a number of factors, especially after the substantial contributions to United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH, 2004-2017); UN-led efforts to improve peacekeeping training; and the call at the UN to “do more with less.” The resulting collaborative ties—especially those of South-South cooperation—range from ad hoc arrangements and bilateral agreements to multilateral configurations, whether they build on pre-existing cooperation arrangements (for instance, the Union of South American Nations, UNASUR) or through the creation of dedicated bodies, especially the Latin American Association for Peace Operations Training Centers (ALCOPAZ). While this cooperation among PTCs promotes greater knowledge exchange, diffuses

the lessons learned, and encourages innovation in peacekeeping training, gaps and challenges remain that could be addressed through the following recommendations:

- Establish clear principles and a framework for PTC cooperation;
- Institutionalize bilateral cooperation among PTCs through formal agreements such as MoUs and multi-year work plans;
- Enhance cooperation on peacekeeping training methodologies;
- Take advantage of ALCOPAZ mechanisms to improve bilateral cooperation;
- Explore the organization and processes of the *Cruz del Sur* Brigade and possibilities of its deployment as well as other bi/multi-national peace force arrangements between Latin American countries;
- Deepen cooperation in inclusiveness in peacekeeping, including through knowledge exchange on gender and the role of women in peace operations;
- Deepen cooperation on police training by incorporating relevant police academies;
- Promote the participation of Latin American civilians both in peacekeeping training and missions in the field;
- Improve cooperation with African PTCs through the use of Mobile Training Teams (MTTs); and
- Promote the meaningful participation of civil society entities such as think tanks, research centers, and universities in PTC networks and other cooperation arrangements.



Protection of Civilians Course at CCOPAB, 2013

## Introduction

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping has been changing fast in the post-Cold War era—from new actors to emerging challenges and shifting mandates. Since 1990, this approach to tackling armed conflict has expanded dramatically, with 100,746<sup>2</sup> uniformed and civilian personnel currently serving in 14 missions around the globe. In addition, peacekeeping missions face increasingly complex settings that include not only state actors, but also a broadening gamut of non-state actors such as insurgent groups, organized crime networks, and terrorist organizations. In addition, civilians (including children) and humanitarian organizations have become frequent targets in conflict settings. Part of the response to these dynamics is a noticeable (if controversial) trend towards robust peacekeeping, involving all necessary means to deter major threats and maintain law and order, as well as a greater emphasis on the protection of civilians (PoC).

Amidst all of these changes, there is growing recognition both within and outside the UN peace and security architecture that peacekeeping must be made more effective, especially in face of major budget cuts and wavering leadership by traditional actors. This policy brief focuses on one area in which innovation has become more urgent than ever: enhancing the effectiveness of peacekeeping through better training.

More specifically, we address emerging configurations of international cooperation for peacekeeping training, drawing on the case of Latin America. How do Latin American states cooperate to increase the quality of their peacekeeping training? What innovations has this cooperation brought about, and what are the main challenges ahead? The brief is structured in three parts. In the first section, we provide some background on UN peacekeeping training and the role that Latin America has played in peacekeeping. In the second section, we analyze cooperation arrangements among the region's PTCs. The final part of the brief offers recommendations on how to promote further innovation through peacekeeping training cooperation.



Protection of Civilians Course at CCOPAB, 2013

## I. Background

### ***a) UN Peacekeeping Training, from Nuts and Bolts to Geopolitics***

By peacekeeping training, we draw on the UN definition to refer to “strategic investment that enables UN military, police and civilian staff to effectively implement increasingly multifaceted mandates.”<sup>3</sup> In this context, peacekeeping training refers to any activity aiming to enhance mandate implementation by equipping UN military, police or civilian personnel, both individually and collectively, with the knowledge, skills, and attitudes needed to meet the evolving challenges of peacekeeping operations, to perform their specialist functions, and to demonstrate the core values and competencies of the UN<sup>4</sup>. Peacekeeping training can take place during the pre-deployment phase, early in deployment (with mission-specific induction training), and ongoing training, for instance via substantive/specialized training, career development and corporate training, and cross-cutting training. While member states are responsible for training their own personnel, the UN Secretariat provides the main parameters.<sup>5</sup>

The challenge of adequately preparing peacekeepers for UN missions arose with the first armed peacekeeping operation in 1956, and the demands and concerns have varied over time. Over the past twenty years, incremental steps have been taken at the UN to improve peacekeeping training. In the aftermath of the failures to avoid genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda, UN member states recognized their responsibility in providing pre-deployment training for uniformed personnel based on UN peacekeeping training standards and materials. The Brahimi Report (2000)<sup>6</sup> offered specific recommendations for the production of peacekeeping training manuals. Nevertheless, it was only in 2007, with the restructuring of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the creation of the Department of Field Support (DFS), that a formal structure for training was established at the Secretariat. The Integrated Training Service (ITS), under the also new Division for Policy, Evaluation and Training (DPET), was designed to be a dedicated hub for peacekeeping training.<sup>7</sup> ITS has been tasked with developing training standards, policies, and materials; developing and delivering cross-cutting peacekeeping training; and overseeing peacekeeping training activities and providing technical support<sup>8</sup>. The creation of a specialized structure has

helped to institutionalize and harmonize minimum standards of UN peacekeeping, but in practice wide divergences remain among troop and police contributing countries (T/PCCs), even when deploying to the same mission<sup>9</sup>.

In addition to these institutional changes, several UN processes have aimed to improve peacekeeping training. By 2009, in the context of the New Horizon process<sup>10</sup>, a small but important self-evaluation by UN Police (UNPOL) took place, recognizing the importance of training. Around the same time, Operational Readiness Assurance (ORA) mechanisms were put in place to help ensure that troops had the required competencies. Over time, these institutional and doctrinal efforts have induced a degree of cultural change in UN peacekeeping training, notably an attempt to incorporate conflict resolution approaches, including negotiation skills, in the preparation of military, police, and civilian personnel<sup>11</sup>.

Although the Secretariat has developed guidance and scenario-based materials for training, in 2015 by the Independent High Level Panel on Peace Operations, which called for “a stronger global training partnership” for effective training<sup>12</sup>, called for a mechanism designed to monitor and evaluate the training led by T/PCCs. That same year, Rwanda led and hosted a conference on the protection of civilians that brought together the major T/PCCs and financial contributors. The resulting “Kigali Principles” (2016) emphasized the need for “high level of training and preparedness on peacekeeping operations” for effective protection of civilians in the field.<sup>13</sup> In 2017, the Cruz Report went a step further, arguing that “deficient pre-deployment training is one of the main causes of fatalities and serious injuries in the field”<sup>14</sup>. The Report addresses specific ways of improving pre-deployment training, for instance through the inclusion of preparation for specific threats like operating in jungle settings or in areas with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), as well as adequate in-mission training.

At the same time, peacekeeping training is hardly a matter of finding automatic solutions for specific problems that arise in the field. Politics heavily influences the way in which peacekeeping training has changed and been institutionalized. First, there is a deepening divide between decision makers and donor states, on one hand, and those that deploy troops, police, and civilians to missions, on the other. Notably, Western countries have engaged selectively on the ground when doing so serves their interests, whereas developing countries are tasked with direct engagement while remaining seriously under-resourced development of peacekeeping policy, including mandate formulation and renewal, which is concentrated in the UN Security Council<sup>15</sup>. Second, T/PCCs are prickly at the idea of external assessments of their training practices, and sometimes resist efforts at detailed monitoring and evaluation. From a cooperation perspective, this stance can hamper the exchange of knowledge and lessons learned. And third, specific issues have arisen around peacekeeping that are sometimes interpreted as pitting “Northern” interests and/or perspectives against “Global South” concerns, as has occurred with the ongoing debate on sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) in the context of peace operations. All of these factors shape not only norms and practices at PCCs, but also the ways in which they cooperate.

## ***b) Latin America's Role in UN Peacekeeping***

The developments and political dynamics in peacekeeping have been relevant to states from Latin America, due to their longstanding participation in UN peacekeeping. Both Argentina and Chile contributed with resources and/or observers to the first UN peacekeeping mission, deployed to the Middle East (the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, UNTSO), in 1948. Brazil took

part in the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I, 1956-67), which was the first to include military formed units. In the next few decades, although the number of missions was limited (only 18 between 1945 and 1990) compared with the post-Cold War years, Latin American countries continued to contribute to UN peacekeeping missions around the globe<sup>16</sup>.

After the end of the Cold War, when the UN Council was able to deploy more peacekeeping missions, Latin American participation diversified even further, with deployments to places like Mozambique, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Timor-Leste. After the turn of the millennium, Latin American countries played an especially visible role in MINUSTAH (2004-2017). The mission in Haiti was particularly important not only in encouraging more institutionalized peacekeeping training among the region's contributing countries, but also in accelerating the process of military cooperation in the Latin America<sup>17</sup>. The numbers reflect the magnitude of this mobilization: Brazil alone sent 37,449 personnel to Haiti during the 13 years of MINUSTAH.<sup>18</sup> In 2011, in the aftermath of the earthquake that devastated much of the country in January 2010, three Latin American countries had 46,8 % of the total military deployed in Haiti (Brazil had 2,187, Uruguay 1,130, and Argentina 715)<sup>19</sup>.

With the end of MINUSTAH in 2017, these numbers have dropped significantly, but the geographic spread of Latin America's participation remains considerable. In May 2018, 16 of 20 Latin American countries were contributing to the 14 ongoing UN peacekeeping missions with a total of 2,230 police and military. This corresponds to 2,44% of the total. In April 2018, Uruguay was the top contributing country in the region (936 personnel), followed by Argentina (286), Brazil (271), Peru (234), and El Salvador (173). Brazil was present in ten missions; Argentina had personnel in seven missions; and Uruguay, in six<sup>20</sup>. These deployments included missions in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, reflecting the willingness of Latin American states to deploy well beyond their own region.

Some of these sizeable participations entail require highly specialized training; for instance, Brazil has led the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force (MTF) since 2011, and Uruguay's largest contingent in 2018, with more than 900 peacekeepers, is with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO)<sup>21</sup>. As a result of this diversification, Latin American countries have built up capacity-building not only for general participation in UN peacekeeping, but also for mission-specific requirements.

In light of Latin America's diverse and longstanding (if oscillating) participation in UN peacekeeping, the next section of this policy brief provides an overview of PTCs in the region, as well as their current challenges and cooperation strategies. Special attention is given to the multilateral and trans-regional cooperation efforts and achievements of these PTCs.



Protection of Civilians Course at CCOPAB, 2013

## II. Latin American Peacekeeping Training Centers

By peacekeeping training center, we refer to national institutions that are dedicated to the preparation and education of military, police and/or civilians for deployment in peacekeeping operations. The structures of these centers vary widely, as do their locations within state and Armed Force organograms. In some instances, centers congregate the “trainers of trainers,” while in others, they may also serve for direct training of troops, police, and civilian personnel. Finally, T/PCCs vary in terms of how centralized the training is in such centers. In some countries, police training is carried out by police academies rather than the PTCs, although collaborative ties typically ensure a degree of knowledge exchange and harmonization of practices. All such centers cooperate with the UN headquarters and other organizations involved in peacekeeping and related operations, as well as with other PTCs. In some instances, such as that of Brazil, PTCs may also collaborate with civil society institutions in carrying out research, developing curricula, and conducting training activities.

### **a) Overview of Latin American Peacekeeping Centers**

The first Latin American country to create a PTC was Uruguay, in 1982. Nowadays, Latin America has a total of eleven training centers or facilities dedicated to preparing military, police, and/or civilian personnel to peacekeeping operations. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, and Peru have also created centers (see Figure 1 below) that offer a myriad of courses and cooperation initiatives aimed at improving performance in the field. Bolivia has a specialized department within its Army tasked with peacekeeper training, and in Guatemala a Regional Command is responsible for these activities. Out of these eleven, nine are located in South America, reflecting the subregion’s considerable role in total Latin American staff contributions to UN missions.

In line with the changing environment of UN peacekeeping operations and escalating challenges and complexities, these institutions also generate knowledge about peacekeeping training, whether in-house or through collaboration with other institutions. Constant innovation is needed due not only because of the changing nature and requirements of peacekeeping missions, but also due to the emerging opportunities presented for these countries to participate in peacekeeping missions, especially after the surge in participation of Latin American troops in MINUSTAH.

**Figure 1.** Latin American Peacekeeping Training Centers (PTCs)

<b>Country</b>	<b>Center</b>
Argentina	Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto Para Operaciones de Paz (CAECOPAZ)
Bolivia	Departamento de Operaciones de Paz del Ejército de Bolivia (DOPE)
Brazil	Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB)
Chile	Centro Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz de Chile (CECOPAC)
Colombia	Escuela De Misiones Internacionales Y Acción Integral (ESMAI)
Ecuador	Unidad Escuela Misiones de Paz de Ecuador (UEMPE)
Guatemala	Comando Regional de Entrenamiento de Operaciones de Mantenimiento de Paz (CREOMPAZ)
Mexico	Centro de Entrenamiento Conjunto de Operaciones de Paz de México (CECOPAM)
Paraguay	Centro de Entrenamiento y Capacitación Para Operaciones de Paz Paraguay (CECOPAZ-PARAGUAY)
Peru	Centro de Entrenamiento y Capacitación Para Operaciones de Paz (CECOPAZ-PERU)
Uruguay	Escuela Nacional de Operaciones de Paz de Uruguay (ENOPU)

These centers share a number of similarities, especially with respect to when they were created and the values they promote. Aside from the pioneering case of Uruguay, Latin American countries began to increase their participation in UN peacekeeping operations—and therefore, thinking more systematically about peacekeeping training—in the 2000s. However, this training remained ad hoc and/or implemented by divisions of existing Armed Force institutions. From providing short-term training for small contingents, these countries' armed forces began to expand their objectives, implementing dedicated centers that were typically linked to their respective Defense Ministries and, in some cases (as in Chile, Brazil and Argentina), specialized physical facilities.

With the exception of Uruguay's ENOPU (1982) and Argentina's CAECOPAZ (1995), all other training centers in the region were officially founded in the 2000s. During this decade and the years since, many of these PTCs have undergone a degree of institutionalization, whether through the diversification of activities, expansion of initiatives and physical space, and/or signing of new cooperation agreements.

Most of region's centers train a combination of military, police and civilian personnel, although there is a heavy emphasis on military. There are also some exceptions in how integrated these trainings are. For instance, CAECOPAZ does not offer police training because this is offered through Argentina's National Gendarmerie, specifically the *Centro de Capacitación para Operaciones Policiales de Paz* (CENCAPOPAZ). For military in particular, specialized training is offered by some of these centers for a wide variety of ranks, from soldiers to staff officers and military commanders<sup>22</sup>. Some of these centers offer training for civilians; Argentina's CAECOPAZ and Brazil's CCOPAB, for instance, offer separate courses for journalists, for UN employees, and for other civilians working on conflict-affected or unstable contexts, as well as courses on civil-military coordination.

A number of these PTCs offer mission-specific trainings, some of which have evolved over the course of many years. CECOPAC offers mission-specific trainings for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Cyprus<sup>23</sup>. In some instances, the PTC offers initial training, and additional preparation is provided elsewhere in Armed Forces installations—as is the case with Brazil's training for Lebanon, which starts at CCOPAB and then moves to a specialized naval training center, the *Centro de Adestramento Almirante Marques de Leão* (CAAML), due to the expertise in the use of naval vessels and associated equipment. Some centers (e.g. CCOPAB and CAECOPAZ) include among their course specific subjects that are presented yearly, while others, like CECOPAZ and UEMPE, offer them as mission needs arise.

One noticeable trend is the increasing availability and institutionalization of courses and seminars addressing gender and the role of women in peacekeeping. This trend is aligned with the UN's efforts to highlight the contribution of women as indispensable to international peace and security through the Women, Peace and Security agenda resulting from Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)<sup>24</sup>, and in some cases through the National Action Plans (NAPs) that have resulted from this agenda. While the tasks of expanding the participation of women in peacekeeping operations and enhancing training in this area still face challenges—for instance, there are very few female instructors in Latin American PTCs—there have been some positive developments. In addition to expanding course offerings on gender and peacekeeping and some efforts to mainstream a gender perspective in training, some landmark examples have brought greater attention to the need to expand the role of women both in peacekeeping missions and in training for such operations. In 2018, Lieutenant Colonel Andréa Firmo became the first Brazilian female officer, from the Army, to play the role of a military observer. In preparation for her first mission, MINURSO, Firmo attended several courses in Brazil (CCOPAB), Canada, and Uruguay<sup>25</sup>. The expansion of gender offerings in Latin American PTCs thus illustrates an area of innovation that is closely linked to a UN global agenda.

## **b) Latin American PTC Cooperation Strategies**

Especially since the 2000s, cooperation strategies among Latin American PTCs have diversified along both bilateral and multilateral lines. On the bilateral front, new ties have been built upon a long-standing tradition among the region's states. Brazil and Argentina, Chile and Argentina, Chile and Peru, Brazil and Paraguay, to mention a few, have developed bilateral initiatives in defense and security since the past century. Some of these ties have culminated in cooperation for peacekeeping training, particularly for MINUSTAH, such as the efforts led together by Paraguay and Brazil, whose collaboration for MINUSTAH included the training and assistance for a small Paraguayan contingent within the Brazilian battalion.<sup>26</sup>

The most frequent type of bilateral cooperation for peacekeeping training in Latin America involves officer exchanges, mainly as instructors, but also as trainees. Notably, this type of cooperation has been historically common between military colleges and academies in the region; the innovation is the expansion of this policy for the area of peacekeeping training. In this regard, Brazil has sent CCOPAB officers to Paraguay and received officers from Ecuador and Peru, among other partners.<sup>27</sup> In addition, Brazil's CCOPAB has a continuous cooperation with Argentina and Chile, as well as France. Through these exchanges, Latin American PTCs share lessons learned about doctrine, curriculum design, and mission-specific information, while deepening their familiarity with one another's institutions and practices. Some of these ties extend well beyond the region, not only with donor countries but also with other developing countries. For instance, Brazil has sought to establish partnerships with African countries<sup>28</sup>, the region that concentrates most UN peacekeeping missions.

This type of cooperation among T/PCCs represents an important example of trans-regional South-South cooperation, since these are developing countries facing some similar challenges, especially in terms of resource limitations, and committed to horizontal exchanges.<sup>29</sup> With the end of MINUSTAH in October 2017, more Latin American countries have turned their attention to peacekeeping missions in Africa<sup>30</sup>, increasing the importance of deepening connections and learning from African T/PCCs such as Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Ghana—all of which have vast experience deployed around their own continent.<sup>31</sup> In this regard, in 2017, Brazil established a bilateral agreement with Ethiopia—the single largest T/PCC—to send a Brazilian officer to work as an instructor and advisor on a broad gamut of activities<sup>32</sup> at the Ethiopia's Peace Support Training Center<sup>33</sup>.

Another mode of bilateral cooperation involves the use of mobile training teams (MTTs). These teams consist of three to four military training officers, normally experts in a specific area, who are sent from one country's PTC to another's. This kind of partnership might be useful for supporting Latin American countries that are in the early stages of developing their centers, such as Mexico, and for improving expertise and military relationship between countries with consolidated centers, such as Chile and Brazil. The latter has sent MTTs to Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Colombia, and Mexico.<sup>34</sup> In the case of Mexico, the CCOPAB MTT organized the first preparation course for Subunit and Section for Mexican military preparing for deployment in UN peacekeeping missions. The course was held in a military field in Huehuetoca, Mexico, for a total of 31 Army officials and 10 Marines<sup>35</sup>.

Another noteworthy example of bilateral cooperation among Latin American PTCs involves the *Cruz del Sur* Brigade—a joint peace force that was discussed and created in the mid-2000s through a partnership between Argentina and Chile for UN peacekeeping. Through this arrangement, the two

countries contribute with human and material resources.<sup>36</sup> In 2011, the brigade became part of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS)<sup>37</sup>, although, as of May 2018, despite continuing to conduct training exercises, it had not been deployed.<sup>38</sup> The brigade represents an innovative partnership that extends well beyond the training-focused ties seen in other bilateral forms of cooperation in the region.

Multilaterally, Latin American PTCs have enhanced cooperation at the international and regional levels. As in the case of bilateral cooperation, stronger multilateral ties have also emerged between Latin American countries due to the regional engagement in MINUSTAH. Notably, the ALCOPAZ was created in 2008. It was founded by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru and Uruguay, aiming at enhancing communication between Latin American PTCs. ALCOPAZ includes the possibility of creating cooperation agreements between its members for exchanging students, instructors, and teachers to provide regional expertise in the region. Consequently, in 2013, there was a considerable increase in peacekeeping trainer exchanges between ALCOPAZ PTCs.<sup>39</sup>

The coordination between Latin American countries has also strengthened their voices as T/PCCs at UN debates. For instance, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Peru and Uruguay have served as engaged members of the UN Group of Friends of Haiti.<sup>40</sup> In this regard, ALCOPAZ serves to consolidate and improve regional integration in security matters, exchanging knowledge and know-how for the training of personnel and for peace operations activities.

There have also been efforts to use subregional organizations to expand cooperation in peacekeeping. The 2015 creation of the South American Defense College (*Escuela Suramericana de Defensa*, ESUDE) in the context of the Union of South American Nations (Unión de Naciones Suramericanas, UNASUR), prompted Uruguay to propose that this become a reference for Latin American peacekeeping. However, the potential of this platform to contribute substantially towards Latin American peacekeeping has been called into question by the April 2018 announcement that six South American states suspended their membership in UNASUR<sup>41</sup>.

At the international level, Latin American PTCs also take part in the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC), founded in Canada in 1995 and now encompassing a broad gamut of peacekeeping centers around the globe, as well as other institutions and experts. IAPTC aims at contributing to peacekeeping effectiveness, facilitating communication, and fomenting the exchange of best practices among members, and it holds an annual conference that brings together 120 to 140 members. The 2002 meeting was hosted by Argentina, the 2006 edition by Chile, and the 2015 event by Brazil. However, no Latin American country has hosted the IAPTC secretariat thus far, and in 2018 there was only one Latin American representative in the organization's Executive Committee (from Uruguay, serving as head of the Military Committee)<sup>42</sup>.

In sum, despite a degree of diversification in the past ten years, cooperation among Latin American PTCs remains weak, and there is ample space to expand and deepen these ties. Most of this cooperation follows bilateral channels, but regional forums that encompass space for training (namely, ALCOPAZ) are not adequately institutionalized or lack political space to advance in this direction, as in the case of UNASUR. The end of MINUSTAH may pose a unique challenge if the momentum provided by the mission to Latin America peacekeeping training and cooperation is lost.



Exercicio Viking, 2018. Photo: E. Hamann

### III. Challenges and Recommendations

In order to be made more effective, UN peacekeeping requires better training, including through greater cooperation and innovation by T/PCCs. Latin American states have demonstrated a historical commitment to peacekeeping, especially via the UN, since the organization’s first mission was deployed. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, this participation experienced considerable expansion through MINUSTAH, which generated new demands for peacekeeping training in the region. Another driver was the series of efforts led by the UN headquarters to harmonize and improve peacekeeping training through organizational innovations as well as normative frameworks. Finally, the current context of shrinking budgets, uncertain leaderships and the call to “do more with less” have placed greater emphasis on the need for more effective peacekeeping training. All of these factors have shaped not only the way in which Latin American PTCs carry out training, but also the emerging configurations of cooperation, especially (although not exclusively) among centers within the region.

This cooperation—much of which can be denominated South-South cooperation for peacebuilding—has assumed a variety of forms that range from bilateral agreements and ad hoc arrangements to more formalized, multilateral configurations, both utilizing pre-existing cooperation arrangements (for instance, UNASUR) and through the creation of dedicated networks, especially ALCOPAZ. In turn, this ecology of cooperation ties has undergone a considerable degree of institutionalization and diversification, allowing for greater knowledge exchange, lessons learned, and—ultimately—innovation in peacekeeping training.

At the same time, there are gaps to be filled, both in terms of participation (for instance, boosting the role of police and civil society entities) and with respect to meeting specific demands, for example through emerging out of present and future engagements in Africa missions. Indeed, a number of challenges remain to enhancing cooperation among Latin American PTCs. First, the end of MINUSTAH and the uncertainty around future deployments means that the impetus that the mission provided for peacekeeping training in the region has decreased. Although the

establishment of cooperation venues has created a degree of path dependence in Latin American PTC cooperation, the possible “turn to Africa” has yet to trigger another wave of specialization and cooperation.

Second, the varying organizational structures of Latin American PTCs pose some obstacles to cooperation, in that, at least in some instances, communications do not always flow across equivalent hierarchies and ranks. In addition, despite the adoption of UN minimum standards, there are differences in norms and practices, from certification systems to training evaluation methods. Gaps in communication with the UN Secretariat, for instance regarding the comparative conditions across UN missions, also create challenges for tailored training<sup>43</sup>.

Likewise, divergences in the degrees to which these countries invest in peacekeeping institutions, personnel and equipment create some disparities that, even as they become themes for cooperation, may also make that collaboration more difficult. Scarce resources, especially given the context of economic retraction in several Latin American countries, may exacerbate this gap, leading to the loss of gained expertise and institutional memory. Finally, from a political angle, Latin American states and especially their Armed Forces have maintained positions of national sovereignty that may hamper cooperation for peacekeeping training. There are thus gaps in mutual confidence-building that also need to be addressed among the region’s PTCs.

In order to maximize the opportunities accruing from Latin American PTC cooperation and meeting the challenges identified above, the following actions are recommended:

- Establish clear principles for PTC cooperation, working towards a framework that will help harmonize norms and practices at a wide gamut of institutions;
- Take advantage of ALCOPAZ mechanisms not only to deepen multilateral initiatives but also to improve bilateral cooperation, particularly the exchange of trainers with expertise in a particular area;
- Enhance cooperation on peacekeeping training methodologies, including as they relate to evaluation and certification, for instance through the sharing of benchmarks and baselines for individuals and groups, and developing evaluation methodologies geared at producing “lessons learned;”
- Enhance cooperation on police training by incorporating not only PTCs but also relevant police academies;
- Promote the participation of Latin American civilians both in peacekeeping training, as instructors, and in deployments to UN mission;
- Seek ways to improve cooperation with African PTCs, including through the use of Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) as a cost-effective option;
- Explore the organization and processes of the *Cruz del Sur* Brigade and possibilities of its deployment as well as other bi/multi-national peace force arrangements between Latin American countries;
- Deepen cooperation in inclusiveness in peacekeeping, including through knowledge exchange on gender and the role of women, and leveraging the National Action Plans (NAPs) on Women, Peace and Security; and
- Promote the meaningful participation of civil society entities such as think tanks, research centers, and universities in PTC networks and other cooperation arrangements.

# Endnotes

1 Adriana Erthal Abdenur is Coordinator of the International Peace and Security division at Igarapé Institute. Giovanna Kuele is a researcher at Igarapé, and Ariane Francisco is an intern at the institute. The authors thank Eduarda Hammann for her thoughtful comments.

2 Uniformed Personnel as of 30 April 2018: 87,916; Civilian Personnel as of August 2017: 12,830. Source: UN Peacekeeping (2018) "Data": <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data>

3 UN Peacekeeping Resource Hub (1998) "Peacekeeping Resource Hub": <http://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community/training>

4 *Ibid.*

5 *Ibid.*

6 UN (2000) "Brahimi Report: Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations", July: [http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/brahimi\\_report.shtml](http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/brahimi_report.shtml)

7 UN Peacekeeping Resource Hub (1998).

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## About the ICP Initiative

Innovation in Conflict Prevention (ICP) is a project aimed at identifying promising approaches, responses, and practices in the prevention in armed conflict, focusing on six country case studies in Africa.

The initiative is led by Instituto Igarapé, a think and do tank based in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and funded by Global Affairs Canada.

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