HASOW HUMANITARIAN ACTION IN SITUATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

Discussion Paper 10
July 2014

Os Deslocados: Conceptualizing Internal Displacement in Brazil

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Abstract

Whilst Brazil experiences comparatively high rates of violence and massive development interventions in its cities and hinterland, the scale and dynamics of cross-border or internal displacement are virtually unknown. There is a sparse literature on cross-border migration, whether voluntary or forced. Even less is known about internal displacement. In order to fill this knowledge gap, this working paper introduces a simple typology conceptualizing internal displacement in Brazil. It detects a range of different - albeit interconnected - pathways to population displacement including violence, development and disaster. An underlying characteristic of displacement in Brazil, as elsewhere, is the relative levels of vulnerability. The paper also considers state and civil society responses and opportunities for scaling-up engagement.

1 This working paper was originally prepared for a conference examining new trends in displacement convened by UNHCR and the London School of Advanced Studies in May 2014. Credit is due to David Cantor and others for their comments on the draft. Special thanks must be extended to Gustavo Diniz, from the Igarapé Institute, for his inputs to the paper.

Introduction

Although Brazil experiences comparatively high rates of violence and massive development interventions in its cities and hinterland, little is known about the scale, dynamics of cross-border or internal displacement. There is a sparse literature on cross-border migration, whether voluntary (emigration and immigration) or forced (refugee and asylum claimants). Even less is known about internal displacement - including patterns of population movement between cities, within cities or among neighborhoods. With the exception of annual reports on the number of refugees and asylum claimants residing in Brazil, information and analysis on so-called internally displaced persons (IDPs) are absent from reports of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), the two key authorities supplying data to the forced migration community.

In order to fill this knowledge gap, this article outlines a rudimentary typology to conceptualize internal displacement in Brazil. While obviously connected to international population dislocation, the article is especially focused on domestic experiences. It detects a range of different - albeit interconnected - pathways to population displacement including violence, development and disaster. An underlying characteristic of displacement in Brazil, as elsewhere, is the relative levels of vulnerability and resilience of those most susceptible to being forcibly relocated. It is often those households and individuals confronting an accumulation of risks who tend to be most likely to be displaced. This paper first reviews the literature on migration and displacement as it relates to Brazil. It then presents a range of different factors shaping displacement, highlighting the ways in which they intersect. The paper closes with a reflection on the legal and operational opportunities to prevent displacement and protect those affected. It is intended to stimulate a forward-looking research agenda and a unified conceptualization of the forced migration challenge in the country and its cities.

Migration and displacement - known unknowns

Brazil is a country of migration. The vast majority of its more than two hundred million residents are the children of immigrants and slaves spanning five centuries. Huge numbers of the country´s citizens relocate in order to improve their standards of living. Several basic characteristics are commonly attributed to large-scale migratory flows in Brazil. On the one hand, the principal axis of population movement in the country has long been from the northeast to the southeast, though this seems to have slowed in recent decades. The principle motive for people to migrate and emigrate[2] is economic, with cities in the southern parts of the country providing a magnet for surplus labor throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The impulse to move has also been shaped by harsh environmental conditions in northern and northeast states as well as increasing concerns with deteriorating security. Over the past several decades, migration flows have been oriented toward medium-sized cities rather than the major urban centers of the country, with a growing level of inter-city movement since the 1980s.

The impulse to move was also shaped by harsh environmental conditions in northern and northeast states as well as increasing concerns with deteriorating security.

If there is limited treatment of voluntary migratory patterns in Brazil, there is a veritable silence in the literature on the dynamics and characteristics of displacement and involuntary resettlement. One of the only comprehensive assessments of migration patterns in the country was generated by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). Its 2011 report examined the migratory patterns of Brazilians domestically and internationally as well as inflows of foreign nationalities over time.[3] However, the IBGE report does not examine the underlying motivations or "triggers" of migration, forced or otherwise. Notwithstanding the limited empirical treatment of the subject, there is a widespread recognition that a considerable numbers of Brazilians have elected to leave the country, of their own volition, owing to concerns with crime, violence and insecurity.[4] Many also left during the dictatorship period (1964-1985). The total Brazilian diaspora is unknown, but estimated to be less than 1.5 million people.[5]

Before considering trends in internal displacement and resettlement across Brazil, it is useful to clarify key concepts and underlying assumptions. For the purposes of this article, displacement refers to involuntary population movement. Displacement occurs when the option to remain is physically removed. While the distinctions are not always obvious, displacement can be distinguished from migration which implies some degree

2 There are an estimated 1-3 million Brazilians living abroad, though the numbers are not certain. Consult http://www.univesp.ensinosuperior.sp.gov.br/preunivesp/4271/movimentos-migrat-rios-no-brasil.html. For a summary of the report, consult http://www.brasilescola.com/brasil/migracao-interna-no-brasil.htm.

3 It draws principally on PNAD data. See http://biblioteca.ibge.gov.br/visualizacao/livros/liv49781.pdf.

4 See, for example, http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/mundo/ft0107200707.htm which found violence to be the number one cause of emigration for a sample of 400 Brazilians living in Lisbon.

5 See http://worldmap.harvard.edu/maps/brazildia/FXr.

of "choice" to voluntarily relocate.[6] Indeed, the more recent migration of middle class households in Brazil from large urban centers to medium-sized cities and rural areas to avoid crime is, while in many cases taken reluctantly, a voluntary option.[7] Those who are displaced across borders are "refugees" and "asylum claimants" while those forced to move within territorial boundaries are referred to here as "internally displaced people". Likewise, this paper refers to resettlement as the involuntary planned (and assisted) movement of populations from their place of origin to a new location. Implicit in displacement and resettlement is coercion - though not always explicit violence.[8]

There are likely many more would be refugees from neighboring countries - notably Colombia, Paraguay and Venezuela - who may have been displaced into Brazil even if not formally registered.

Refugee populations are arguably the most visible expression of displacement. While there are ample statistics on their numbers, there is limited publicly available information on the status of refugees in Brazil. The country is not a major producer of refugees or country of asylum.[9] Indeed, the UNHCR estimated in 2012 that there were just 963 Brazilian refugees and 245 asylum seekers or 1,208 "people of concern" originating from Brazil. By contrast, UNHCR estimates that there were some 4,296 refugees[10], 3,075 refugee asylum claimants and a total of 13,529 "people of concern" in the country. Those requesting refugee status in Brazil have been predominantly forced to leave on account of "protection" concerns related to political and criminal violence in their country of origin. There are likely many more would be refugees from neighboring countries - notably Colombia, Paraguay and Venezuela - who may have been displaced into Brazil even if not formally registered.[11]

In Brazil, there is no official taxonomy of internal displacement. Rather, the concept - "deslocados" - seems restricted to individuals, and families forced to flee major climactic or "environmental" events, predominantly intense rains and floods.[12] In other cases, the term is used to describe households and communities who are displaced by large development projects, especially hydro-electric dams, mining schemes, transport

6 These definitions are elaborated in Muggah (2011, 2009).

7 See Vainer (1998), Fausto (2007) and Lisboa (n/d) for a review of these crime-related migration patterns.

8 See Muggah (2009, 2003).

9 For a review of Brazilian statistics on refugees, consult http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e4929a6#. See UNHCR (2005) for a review of trends in refugees and asylum seekers to and from Brazil over various years. Also consult the UNHCR (2012) Global Report and its Latin American overview for a discussion on internal displacement trends across the region. It is notable that there is virtually nothing recorded on Brazil.

10 According to CONARE the number is higher - some 4,305 people, including 2,800 from Africa, 954 from the Americas, 448 from Asia, 98 from Europe and 5 who are stateless. There are purported to be refugees from 70 countries, though most are from Angola, Colombia, the DRC and Liberia. See Moulin (2013).

11 See, for example, the case of Paraguayans forced to flee into Southern Brazil at http://www.campograndenews.com.br/cidades/interior/apos-violencia-e-exodo-xerife-impoe-paz-a-cidade-ao-fechar-bares-as-20h. There are also a considerable number of Haitians that have recently emigrated to Brazil, some of them also claiming refugee status on arrival.

12 See, for example, the focus on environmental displaced populations at http://sites.uepb.edu.br/nepda/?lang=en.

corridors and cattle and agro-industrial estates.[13] With regards to those displaced by conflict, crime or political violence, there is comparatively limited discussion in the media, much less policy and academic communities. There are, for example, very occasional reports on Colombians who are affected by insurgent and drug-related armed groups on the Brazilian border.[14] And yet in spite of exceedingly high rates of urban violence in Brazil, there is virtually no empirical treatment of how low-income populations are alternately trapped or forced to move to avoid being killed, injured or victimized.[15]

Many local analysts and aid workers in Brazilian cities talk of the "law of silence" that grips neighborhoods during periods of intense insecurity. Indeed, this law is ruthlessly enforced by drug trafficking factions, militia groups and the military police.

Part of the challenge in undertaking a systematic assessment of the scope and scale of internal displacement is the silence on the issue from affected neighborhoods and community representatives. Many local analysts and aid workers in Brazilian cities talk of the "law of silence" that grips neighborhoods during periods of intense insecurity. Indeed, this law is ruthlessly enforced by drug trafficking factions, militia groups and the military police. Those who break this law - they are often described as X9s owing to the dial-in crime hotline number - are often executed by armed groups. As a result, the causes and consequences of factional, militia and state-led violence are seldom openly discussed. Respondents are only likely to surface related issues when they trust their interlocutor and can be guaranteed anonymity and protection. Social scientists involved in undertaking research in violence-affected communities across Brazil frequently encounter severe biases in survey response rates in affected (and adjacent) areas.[16] The treatment of the issue, then, tends to be restricted primarily to anecdotes and testimonies.

There are, however, a number of common or recurrent trends that emerge in and around Brazil´s more violent slums, or favelas. For example, it appears that "mass" displacement - as is reported in Colombian, Haitian and Mexican settings - is relatively uncommon. Rather, individuals and families are often expelled by factions and militia in a more deliberate targeted manner. For example, when territory is taken over by armed factions, they may then selectively expel family members of competing groups. This can be seen as a pre-emptive gesture to reduce the prospect of future infiltration or insubordination. Likewise, if a particular "community rule" is broken, then the individual may also be pushed out. Robbery, for example, is often severely punished by drug trafficking and militia groups. Meanwhile, in certain newly militia-dominated

13 See, for example, the work of de Souza (2014).

14 See, for example, Monteiro (2007).

15 See, for example, http://www.observatoriodasmetropoles.net/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=394%3Aa-din%C3%A2mica-urbana-da-viol%C3%AAncia-no-brasil&Itemid=164&lang=pt.

16 The author is currently coordinating a major household survey of the access to health in violence-affected neighborhoods of Rio de Janeiro with respected sociologist, Ignacio Cano. Likewise, the author is also working with partners - NECA and Shine-a-Light - in Sao Paulo and Recife conducting similar digital-based assessments.

communities, there are signs of more widespread displacement. For examples, there are reports of how residents recently benefiting from state-sponsored relocation programs are in fact being displaced by militia intent on re-selling these properties at considerable profit.[17]

It is also worth singling out the relationships between supposedly "voluntary" relocation and displacement in Brazil. In some cities affected by chronic violence, many would-be displaced people in fact leave their communities voluntarily even before they are confronted with an imminent or direct threat. They may do so on a temporary basis with the intent to return. Or they may opt to move away permanently.[18] In some of the country´s major and mid-sized urban centers, there is a constant, but still unpredictable, ebb and flow of population movement in relation to the risks presented by competing armed groups. Many individuals adapt their behavior to the vagaries of their local context and the constantly changing dynamics of their communities. Some residents may lack the financial means to leave, and thus endure quotidian violence without the possibility of moving. And as Brazil´s growing middle class becomes frustrated with these conditions (but lack the resources to leave the country), there is also the chance of rising inter- and intra-city migration. It is exceedingly challenging to accurately gauge these wider trends, however, owing to the fact that real and potential victims tend to remain silent.

17 Observations from community leaders in Batan, Caju, and elsewhere in Rio de Janeiro. April 2014.

18 See Muggah (2011 and 2009) for a discussion of the displacement "continuum" and the ways in which migration and displacement are in some cases both involuntary, even if distinguished by theory and practice.

Conceptualizing displacement - a typology

Although a generalization, there are at least three scenarios that generate internal displacement in Brazil: political and criminal violence, development and resource-related interventions, and natural disasters. All three factors - violence, development and disaster - generate forced displacement but also other forms of voluntary migration as noted above. While treated as separate analytical categories, it is of course the case that these three stresses interact. This is the case in some urban settings where a combination of gang, militia and police violence intersects with urban upgrade and renewal projects and extreme climatic events such as rains and floods. Indeed, the confluence of these different factors is surprisingly common in some of Brazil´s major cities such as Maceio, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, and Sao Paulo, but also medium-sized urban settings across the country.

There are at least three scenarios that generate internal displacement in Brazil: political and criminal violence, development and resource-related interventions, and natural disasters.

It is useful to elaborate a typology to capture the diversity of internal displacement in Brazil. For the purposes of this article, the proposed categorization excludes refugee populations of Brazilians outside of the country as well as refugees and asylum claimants inside Brazil.[19] Also excluded are human beings who are trafficked, though this is admittedly a major problem and source of involuntary population movement.[20] While not complete and lacking quality data, the typology proposed below can nevertheless help in systematizing and clarifying the displacement experience in Brazil (see Figure 1). In elaborating a conceptual framework, this article also advances a possible research agenda for forced migration researchers. Indeed, a unified approach to conceptualizing displacement can help apprehend areas of convergence and underlying political economies shaping the direction of displacement in the country.

Violence-induced displacement invariably comes in many forms and is shaped by a wide assortment of actors. It is worth recalling that Brazil has the world's largest gross number of homicides per year - roughly 50,000 - with most lethal violence concentrated in low-income urban areas and among young males.[21] There is a relationship between lethal violence and displacement. Indeed, displacement flows are commonly induced by organized gangs, militia and criminal groups that are competing for control over territory and drug trafficking routes. Examples include armed criminal groups such as the First Capital Command (PCC), the Red Command CV, Pure Third Command, or Friends of Friends (AdA) that routinely engage in clashes over turf and as retribution

19 Consult Moulin (2013) for a detailed review of the refugee population in Brazil.

20 Indeed, some analysts detected a surge in human trafficking in Brazil in 2013 including for sex work, labor, and organ donatoons. InSight Crime noted an increase of some 1,500 reported cases in 2013. See http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/reports-of-human-trafficking-rise-1500-in-brazil. Also consult http://www.migrante.org.br/migrante/components/com_booklibrary/ebooks/caderno-debates-7.pdf for a review of trafficking in people from Brazil.

21 See http://www.mapadaviolencia.org.br/ for a review of lethal and non-lethal violence in Brazil.

for previous incursions.[22] As noted above, citizens that are routinely singled out as sympathetic or aligned with one faction or another may be targeted for selective displacement (or worse). While residents of favelas tend to adopt enclave mentalities and often resist being forcibly moved[23], there are instances where pressure is so intense as to compel movements of male members of the family who may be targeted, and also women, children and the elderly.

Figure 1. Categorizing internal displacement in Brazil

CATEGORY	TYPE	CHARACTERISTICS
Violence-induced	Gang and militia-induced	Short-, medium- and long-term forms of displacement, including both intra- and inter-city movements. In rare cases includes refugees, but predominantly IDPs.
	Army and police-induced	Short-term forms of displacement during operations, with predominantly intra-city movements. Generates temporary IDP populations and in some cases witness protection.
Development-induced	Infrastructure- and urban upgrade-led	Long-term forms of displacement that may be connected with formal relocation and resettlement programs resulting from dams, electricity projects, roads, and mega-events either in city, but more likely peri-urban areas or neighboring intermediate cities.
	Resource- and land-related	Medium- to long-term forms of displacement between large property owners (soy, beef production) and local minority/low-income groups. Can generate landlessness.
Disaster-induced	Dramatic climate events (floods, rains, drought)To improve my life: 58.7%	Short- to medium-term forms of displacement in urban centers, but also rural peripheral areas. Often results in other forms of (voluntary) migration owing to deteriorating conditions.
	Long-term degradation of land	Long-term displacement from deforested and salinized areas. Can result in small and intermediate relocation. Is often linked to development-induced displacement.

22 See Cruz and Cruz (2013).

23 See Perlman (2009) and Baker (2009).

Other types of displacements occurring as a result of violence are those generated by the armed forces and the country/state´s many police and paramilitary forces - whether military, civil, municipal, federal and others. Indeed, the country´s dictatorship (1964-1985) resulted in a legacy of militarized police forces in each of Brazil's states, many of which are recognized for their extreme use of force. For the past several decades specialized swat teams, including those know by their acronym BOPE in Rio de Janeiro, have been deployed to clean-out favelas of organized drug trafficking groups. These groups are involved in a wide range of social cleansing, extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and torture resulting in considerable community opposition, resistance and often flight. While some efforts have been made to adopt more community/proximity oriented policing approaches in recent years, there is still a disproportionately high rate of violence and short-term displacement that results.[24]

According to some analysts, there are expected to be upward 170,000 people affected by displacement owing to preparations for these events between 2014 and 2016.

Meanwhile, development-induced displacements are widespread and diverse occurring alternately in cities and in rural areas in the hinterland. Indeed, in Brazil, there are high rates of displacement associated with mega-infrastructure projects such as power plants, transportation corridors, water dams and reservoirs and the like extending back generations. For example, major hydro-electric dam projects such as the Itaparica reservoir displaced at least 10,500 families in 1988, though the real number may be higher than 80,000.[25] Likewise, the Tucuri Dam Project (1975-1984) allegedly displaced between 25,000-35,000 people despite pre-project predictions that just 1,750 families would be affected.[26] Media reports have carefully covered the likely impacts of dam construction - including the Belo Monte project (which was temporarily suspended) - in terms of displacing indigenous groups.[27] There is in fact a rich anthropological, ethnographic and sociological literature on the ramifications of large-scale development schemes in rural areas, but these are seldom focused specifically on the characteristics of displacement.[28]

A more recent development is urban displacement (described as "forced evictions") arising from mega-events such preparations related to the World Cup and the Olympics.[29] According to some analysts, there are expected to be upward 170,000 people affected by displacement owing to preparations for these events between 2014 and 2016, though no methodology is supplied.[30] Forced resettlement into planned housing schemes is accompanied by migration of favela and lower-income areas who

24 See Muggah and Mulli (2012).

25 See Scott (2009).

26 See Le Rovere and Mendes (2000).

27 See, for example, http://www.motherjones.com/blue-marble/2010/02/will-brazils-new-dam-displace-indigenous-people. Some 12,000 indigensou people are expected to be impacted by the assive project.

28 See, for example, Pinto (2012). See also the review conducted by Terminski (2013).

29 See, for example, Shotfman (2012).

30 See Zibechi (2012).

are frequently unable to meet the rising costs of living near urban centers.[31] There is also anecdotal evidence of militia groups, some of them aligned with politicians and business interests, involved in hastening evictions and displacement from newly pacified areas of some cities, including Rio de Janeiro and Recife. These reports are still unsubstantiated.

The IDMC estimates that there were as many as 1.4 million people displaced by natural disasters between 2008-2012.

There are other types of development-induced displacements occurring as a result of disputes between landowners and the landless. For example, the ranching, mining and agro-industry and its elites are often implicated in clearing out land and remotely populated settlements- often inhabited by indigenous or mixed ethnic groups - in interior states. Indeed, the country's Landless Movement - or Movimento Sem Terra (MST) - is often involved in widely publicized occupations of land to force permanent relocation. While the issues of land-related disputes generate attention in the media, as well as academic and advocacy circles[32], there is comparatively limited statistical data on the frequency or intensity of such displacement. There is no doubt that such displacement is deeply political and policitized - connected as it is to structural power asymmetries and elite-driven modernization schemes.[33]

Disaster-induced displacement in Brazil is fundamentally connected to pre-existing and perpetuated vulnerabilities of specific population groups, especially those residing in densely populated urban areas and others living in remote rural communities. Indeed, it is not just naturally-occurring events - floods, storms, landslides - alone that precipitate displacement in cities such as Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo or elsewhere.[34] Rather it is the precarious nature of buildings/tenements, the lack of land tenure allowing for more permanent construction, weaknesses in enforcing building codes and enforcing zoning, and the density of population clusters that turn routine crisis into major catastrophes.[35] The IDMC estimates that there were as many as 1.4 million people displaced by natural disasters between 2008-2012, with this figure based on aggregated news reports.[36] There are also major challenges in Brazil associated with longer-term degradation, not least in the interior and northern states. This has precipitated a persistent level of displacement to low-lying coastal areas and intermediate-sized cities.

31 Consult the World Cup and Olmpics portal at http://www.portalpopulardacopa.org.br/ for a review of forced evictions and other challenges related to the World Cup.

32 See, for example, the work of http://www.cptnacional.org.br/.

33 For more information on the impacts of development projects on indigenous and minority groups, consult Sohn (2009).

34 See, for example, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/12/world/la-fg-wn-ff-brazil-floods-20131212.

35 See Cunha (2012).

36 The IDMC reports that there were some 35,000 people displaced in 2012 alone. See http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-figures.

Responses to cross-border and internal displacement

At the international level, Brazil has elaborated a normative and programmatic response when it comes to protecting and addressing the humanitarian needs of refugees arising from war and conflict. Brazil played a role in developing and consolidating the international refugee regime for the past six decades. It ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention in 1961 and the Protocol in 1972 and has served on the Executive Committee of UNHCR since 1958. It hosted European refugees after the Second World War, though its commitment to international protection dropped precipitously during the dictatorship era from the 1960s-1980s. It applied the restrictions of the geographic reserve clause and did not offer protection to non-European refugees.[37] Its record nominally improved in recent decades, though it is still only accepting a relatively small number of new arrivals.

Over the past decade, Brazil has sought to project itself as a major humanitarian player around the world. It is now one of the top ten contributors of relief assistance in the world.

Domestically, Brazil revisited its refugee legislation and introduced a National Law on Refugees in 1996 that came into force in 1997. This was mobilized as part of a National Plan on Human Rights, and emerged as a result of concerted pressure from the Catholic Church, UNHCR and others in civil society. It consolidated the principles and rights guaranteed to refugees, including those set out in the 1951 Convention and the Cartagena Declaration of 1984. Specifically, it reaffirmed the principle of non-refoulement, the possibility of extending refugee status to family members and also created guidelines to determine refugee status as well as a National Committee for Refugees (CONARE).[38] Notwithstanding a declared commitment to enhancing international norms associated with international refugee protection, it has a rather more underwhelming record dealing with internally displaced on the home front.

Over the past decade, Brazil has sought to project itself as a major humanitarian player around the world. It is now one of the top ten contributors of relief assistance in the world, though much of its assistance is distributed in the form of food aid through multilateral institutions such as the World Food Program (WFP). A key pillar of its strategy is ultimately related to food security - managed by its Action Against Hunger division within the Foreign Ministry. It also has the capacity to mobilize a range of federal departments and units to deploy technical assistance, including specialists. And yet with the exception of large-scale responses to natural disasters including floods, mudslides and drought in its neighborhood, there is a deafening silence on the scale and nature of humanitarian crisis within its own borders. Indeed, there does not

37 Argentinians, Chileans, Colombians and Uruguayans who sought refugee status in Brazil were often transited through UNHCR's Rio de Janeiro office on to Europe and North America. See Moulin (2013) and Jubilut (2006).

38 See Moulin (2013).

appear to be a clear policy on internal displacement in Brazil, whether resulting from violence, development or disaster.

If Brazil is to make advances, it is likely that a human rights paradigm would be the most appropriate framework.

It should be possible to locate entry-points for engaging more proactively with the challenges of internal displacement generated by violence, development and disaster. These should enable more effective measures that guarantee human rights for displaced populations before, during and after the displacement event. At present, however, most of Brazil´s legislative and programmatic measures are post hoc, seeking to provide (limited) protections to those forced to move. If Brazil is to make advances, it is likely that a human rights paradigm (as opposed to one founded on international humanitarian law or refugee law) would be the most appropriate framework. Although Brazil exhibits epidemic rates of homicidal violence, the country is not officially at war. The state and city authorities have, in some areas, ceded some authority to organized crime and militia groups, but these settings are not considered "affected by armed conflict" in the conventional sense. The firm application of international humanitarian norms in the context of violence, development, or disaster-induced displacement is likely a non-starter.

There are opportunities to engage more proactively with violence-, development- and disaster-induced displacement in Brazil. With global attention increasingly turning to Brazil, ordinarily internal affairs are becoming increasingly publicized. Likewise, international organizations such as Doctors without Borders (MSF)[39] and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)[40], have launched initiatives focused explicitly on preventing and reducing violence in urban settings.[41] Focused over the past decade on so-called "other situations of violence", they and others have developed a suite of interventions emphasizing early childhood intervention, support to single mothers, sensitization activities in schools, first aid for the wounded, and wider support for the public health system in the city and state.[42] While conscious of the problem, both organizations have not focused explicitly on internal displacement since

39 See http://www.msf.org.br/. MSF first began programs in Brazil in 1991 to confront a cholera epidemic. Since then it has managed some 15 projects in Brazil, including urban projects in Rio de Janeiro. It has since shut down its operations.

40 ICRC has had a regional office in Brazil for decades, but began a major urban violence prevention pilot initiative in 2008 in Rio de Janeiro. The program is set to end in 2014. See http://www.icrc.org/spa/resources/documents/interview/2011/brazil-interview-2011-09-01.htm.

41 Before 2009, the ICRC engagement in Brazil was initiated from Argentina. These were typically limited to "regional" activities (promotion of international humanitarian law with armed forces, human rights law with police forces, and advocacy related to international treaties). They did not have an operational presence in the country and thus were not monitoring the humanitarian situation, let alone issues of internal displacement. Such assessments would have required intensive field-based capabilities. Interview with ICRC delegate in Rio de Janeiro in April 2014.

42 The ICRC is preparing a lessons learned assessment of their five year pilot (2009-2014) to be disseminated later in 2014. See, for example, the recent findings of the HASOW project at www.hasow.org which highlight some of these challenges.

it did not register as a priority among their local interlocutors - including government agencies and community groups. However, there are openings there to start a debate.

In extreme cases, the Brazilian government can move victims and witnesses in and outside of Brazil.

In the meantime, there are other limited programs and projects emerging from civil society to prevent internal displacement and safeguard the rights of those displaced or resettled by a variety of causes. Yet these are still scattered and few in number. For example, major non-governmental organizations such as Afro-reggae, Conectas, Sou da Paz and Viva Rio - while preoccupied with preventing violence, have not responded to the dynamics of internal displacement (with the exception of major floods and rains). One exception appears to be the Migration and Human Rights Institute (IMDH) which focuses predominantly on immigrants to Brazil as well as those internally displaced by violence, development and disaster[43], though it has limited reach and impact. Indeed, it could be precisely owing to the invisibility of the issue - and the corollary law of silence - that it has yet to surface as an urgent priority for agencies across the country.

A recent effort to enhance protections for violence-affected IDPs is the National Program for the Protection of Victims and Witnesses. This initiative was established through Law 9807 (1999) and Decree 3518 (2000) and is managed by the National Department for Human Rights (SNDH). It offers material and psychological assistance to victims of intense crimes and seeks to safeguard their basic rights. In extreme cases, the Brazilian government can move victims and witnesses in and outside of Brazil.[44] A somewhat related program focusing on the protection of children threatened by death - (Programa de Proteção a Crianças e Adolescentes Ameaçados de Morte - PPCAAM) - also offers analogous types of protective services.[45] But apart from limited compensation (at below-market rates), there are virtually no safeguards for those displaced by disasters and development.

Meanwhile, there are emerging norms that protect the rights of development-induced displaced. For example, Brazil´s Ministry of Cities passed policies in 2013 intended to safeguard the rights of residents who are involuntarily resettled from their homes. This intended to reinforce existing Constitutional provisions that guarantee rights to housing and dignified conditions as well as its City Statute that regulating the use of urban property for the collective good. The new policy calls for assessments to be undertaken before development interventions to ensure alternatives to displacement exist as well as "effective economic solutions". Reflecting international best practices[46], for example, the policy also calls for limiting displacement, ensuring adequate housing

43 See, for example, http://www.migrante.org.br/migrante/index.php?option=com_content&view=featured&Itemid=435.

44 Owing to the sensitivities associated with the issue and the program, there is no publicly available information on the scheme.

45 See http://www.sdh.gov.br/assuntos/combates-as-violacoes/programas/lorem-ipsum-dolor-sit-amet-consectetur-adipiscing-elit.

46 See Cernea (1999).

alternatives, protecting environmental conservation areas, and drafting a plan for resettlement with adequate compensation measures. [47] Of course, the proof of the policy´s effectiveness will be in its future implementation.

47 See Cities Alliance (2014) at http://www.citiesalliance.org/brazil-involuntarydisplacementpolicy.

Conclusions

The dynamics of displacement in Brazil are not dissimilar to others middle- and lower-income settings affected by comparatively high rates of insecurity and socio-economic transformation. For several hundred years the country has featured large-scale migratory movements to its cities. This has led to the massive growth and expansion of slums and shantytowns where urban violence and inequality are effectively concentrated. While not meeting international classifications of "war" or "armed conflict", these settings bare many of its hallmarks. Predictably, these same areas also concentrate vulnerability, and along with areas in the northeast where hydro-electric, mining and agro-industry projects are underway, are often the site of displacement induced by natural disasters or evictions related to development. This scenario repeats itself across Latin America where the vast majority of the countries populations reside in cities.

The dimensions of displacement in Brazil are only gradually being acknowledged. Although there is speculation that some 1.5 million Brazilians will be forcibly evicted between 2009-2001 in anticipation of the World Cup and Olympics, there are no firm empirical studies to back these claims.[48] Likewise, there are estimates of a similar number being displaced by natural disasters over the past five years, though few robust empirical studies have been administered to back these claims. Indeed, the true magnitude of Brazil's multiple and interlocking displacement crises are still largely unknown. Part of the challenge is that understandings and responses to displacement continue to be segmented, divided between different public entities, non-governmental agencies and advocacy groups. The typology presented in this short analytical paper offers an introductory roadmap for developing a comprehensive treatment of displacement in the country, and hopefully shed light on the multiple forms of resistance and resilience among those most affected.

There are opportunities to more proactively engage with preventing and minimizing displacement in Brazil, especially through a human rights paradigm. New policies have been introduced that are intended to minimize displacement and involuntary resettlement arising from infrastructure projects and urban upgrading. There are also Constitutional provisions for ensuring adequate housing, land, economic well-being and dignity. Likewise, programs exist to provide protection to those who are threatened by violent displacement, though these are few in number and have limited purchase. A first condition of improving the national, state and city response to displacement is to make the phenomena known. It must be made visible, if a genuinely effective politics of prevention and protection is to emerge.

48 See Zirin (2011) and Moothoo-Padayachie (2011).

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The Humanitarian Action in Situations other than War (HASOW) project is based at the International Relations Institute of the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (IRI-PUC) with support from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). The aim of HASOW is to comprehensively assess the dynamics of urban violence and the changing face of humanitarian action. Administered between 2011 and 2013, HASOW focuses on the dynamics of organized violence in urban settings, including Rio de Janeiro, Ciudad Juarez, Medellin and Port-au-Prince.

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HASOW HUMANITARIAN ACTION IN SITUATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

This work was carried out with the aid of a grant from:

CNPq Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico

instituto de relações internacionais

FAPERJ Fundação Carlos Chagas Filho de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro